Introduction
SOS meta-theory [1] has been very successful in defining general criteria using which one can guarantee useful properties about the language constructs. These meta-theorems can save pages of standard proof thanks to their generic and language-independent formulation. Security properties of language constructs look like promising candidates to be turned into SOS meta-theorems and there has already been an attempt in this direction [8] in the context of process calculi security [2] . In this paper, we give an exploratory account of this issue in the context of language-based security [7] . A number of the ideas presented here can be taken directly to the process calculi security.
In the rest of this paper, we give a superficial overview of information-flow security [7] and in particular non-interference [3] as a central notion in this field. Then, we explore some interesting links between non-interference and our recent work on notions of bisimulation with data [4] . Some ideas regarding SOS meta-theorems for these notions will follow in Section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper and points out future work.
Non-Interference and Bisimulation
An important aspect of security is confidentiality. Confidentiality means that sensitive, or higher-level, information is never revealed in the course of interactions to lower-level users. In other words, confidentiality assures that higher-level information never leaks to lower-levels. A simplistic scenario for information leakage is through explicit assignment of high-level data items to low-level observable variables but it goes far beyond that. A low-level user may infer information about high-level data items by very implicit observations, exploiting so-called covert channels, e.g., by measuring execution time or power consumption.
Non-interference [3, 7] is an important means to assuring end-to-end confidentiality. It simply means that one cannot deduce anything about the high-level data/behavior by observing the low-level part of the system. In addition to confidentiality, non-interference has recently been exploited to support other aspects of security such as availability [9] .
Suppose that we have a programming/specification language with two levels of confidentiality for data types. We denote the operational state of the program with p, h, l where p is the program text, h is the higher level data and l is the low level data, all based on given domains P, H and L. Suppose that the operational semantics of a program is defined in terms of labelled transitions between the above-mentioned states with labels χ ∈ X.
In the setting, a program is called non-interfering if regardless of the higher-level data state, it can always generate the same behavior as well as the lower-level data part during its execution. In order to formalize this informal explanation a number of choices has to be made. First of all a notion of behavior has to be fixed and here we choose the bisimulation semantics. Another important choice concerns the change in the higher-level data state. One may choose an open system semantics in which the higher-level data state can change arbitrarily during the execution or go for a closed system semantics in which higher-level data can only be changed by the entities specified in the system. We investigate both possibilities in the rest of this paper and propose two notions of non-interference, called SL non-interference and ISL non-interference, for open and closed systems, respectively.
Then, the following definitions (inspired by low-bisimilarity of [6] and bisimulation with data of [4] ) are two possible formalizations of non-interference.
Definition 1 (SLNI Bisimulation and SL Non
Programs p and q are SLNI-bisimilar, denoted by p ↔ slni q when there exists an SLNI-bisimulation relation con-
Note that unlike usual notions of bisimilarity, SLNI bisimilarity is not necessarily reflexive and hence, not an equivalence. Intuitively, the above non-interference definition requires for the non-interfering program to reproduce the same low-level data state regardless of the highlevel state. The interesting part of the definition is that at each transition, the programs are compared using all possible high-level and all equal low-level data states. This resembles our notion of stateless bisimulation in [4] . As we motivate there, stateless bisimulation is very robust and compositional but it is usually very strong and difficult to establish. A similar observation can be made with respect to SLNI bisimulation and SL non-interference. An alternative for SL non-interference is the notion of ISL non-interference defined below. 
Definition 2 (SBNI Bisimulation and ISL Non-Interference) A symmetric relation R ⊆ (P × H) 2 is called a StateBased Non-Interference (SBNI) bisimulation relation when
The above definition is motivated by the fact that low-level state can be observed and changed by low-level users while the change in the high-level state is in the hand of the system and if the system is closed, we need not cater for intermediate changes in the high-level states. Note that ISL non-interference is weaker that SL non-interference. We illustrate the above two definitions and their differences using the following simple examples.
Example 1 Consider a programming language with the terminating constant skip, the assignment, conditional (if then else) and the sequential composition (;) operators with the expected operational semantics. Assignment (:=) and condition (==) may compare and assign variables with/to values or other variables, respectively. Suppose that h is a high-level variable and l is a low-level one.
The following programs l := h and if (h == 5) then l := 6 else l := 7 are neither SL nor ISL non-interfering, for they lead to different behavior or low-level values depending on the initial value of the high-level variable h.
Also, if (h == 5) then h := 6 else skip is neither SL nor ISL non-interfering since depending on the initial value of h, it immediately terminates or takes one more assignment step. This kind of behavior is a good source for a timing covert channel.
However, programs h := 5 ; l := h and if (h == 5)then h := 6 else skip are both ISL but not SL non-interfering. In case there is no concurrent change to the higher-level variable, a low-level observer cannot infer anything about the higher-level variable by looking at different executions of the above programs. But by putting these programs in parallel with a higher-level component, we may observe different behavior and end-results depending on the intermediate values of the higher-level variable. For example, regarding the program h := 5 ; l := h, after execution of the first assignment the program evolves into l := h. It clearly does not hold that l := h is non-interfering since the value of l is determined by, now not necessarily fixed, value of h.
On Rule Formats for Non-Interference
Structural Operational Semantics [5] is a commonly accepted method to define labelled transition semantics for languages. A semantic specification in the SOS style comprises a number of deduction rules defining possible transitions of a piece of syntax based on transitions of its constituting parts. Rule formats [1] define certain syntactic forms of deduction rules to be "safe" for certain purposes.
A distinguished class of rule formats is concerned with congruence of notions of behavioral equivalence. Translated into our terms, congruence of a behavioral equivalence usually means compositionality of the corresponding notion of non-interference. That is why in [8] , a particular congruence format is used as a basis for a rule-format for proving non-interference. Following this approach, the sfsl and sfisl formats of [4] provide a convenient starting point. However, we intend to investigating the following possibilities for improving upon the format of [8] in our settings:
1. we would like to investigate separating the concerns of non-interference and its compositionality. This, in our mind, will simplify the resulting (this time, two separate) rule formats. Using one rule format one can check whether a non-interference property holds for a particular construct and using the other format one can check the robustness of the proven non-interference under different contexts. The rule format reported in [8] is, to our subjective judgment, too complicated to be understood and checked by a practitioner in this field and we hope that our proposal for separation of concerns will simplify the outcomes.
2. Secondly, we propose to study compositionality and non-interference for restricted language contexts and constructs, respectively. This is in contrast with the common practice of using SOS meta-theory for proving a property of a language as a whole. We can hardly imagine that any general-purpose language will provide compositional noninterference for all of its syntactically valid programs but rather, it is desirable to check whether a particular language construct (or a composed context) is non-interfering. For example, any language with a general assignment operator should not fit such a format while certain patterns of assignment can be easily proven to be non-interfering.
